Re (6): Religion or no Religion?

Hello again,

I was recently reading an intelligent counter-perspective entitled Have Godless Societies Killed More People? written by Cliff Walker of Positive Atheism Magazine in answer to the allegation that more atrocities have been committed in the name of atheism than theism, which is essentially the other side to your argument (akin to what Linda expressed). Walker brings out a lot of thought-provoking points, though there are a few obvious flaws in Walker's argumentation as well, such as calling John 15:6 a command when it is merely a statement made by Jesus and then using that mistaken premise to argue a point. But even more paramount than that (which in the scale of the argument is really a very minor oversight), I don't think it is entirely fair to say that theists are being "patently unfair" to suggest that the negative assertion of atheism does not have wider repercussions: the way we answer the "God question" is going to have an effect on most other decisions we make in life because it is a very foundational question; we would not be arguing in favor of atheism if it were not important to us. But of course that does not automatically mean that all atheists—or even the largest percentage of atheists—are going to be malefactors or deviants much less slaughter people by the millions; it simply means that the way we answer the question of God will impact our lives in one way or another. For example, we may very well try to do even greater things with our lives because we have no assurance of eternity; some of the most profound philosophers were atheists motivated by the transience of a life they had concluded terminated at death. Also, Walker's claim that theism is primarily about party loyalty seems to me every bit as sweeping a generalization as he speaks out against in his (for the most part) cogent argument about why implicating all atheists is fallacious; we might say theism can be used as a tool for instilling party loyalty, not that it is itself about party loyalty: that falls back into the very trap of fallacious reasoning he is arguing against.

In any event, my purpose here is not to recreate Walker's entire argument—you are perfectly capable of reading his argument for yourself—but instead to pull out a few of the stronger points there and then bring them to bear in the argument here, which is not to primarily argue the manifest superiority of theism over atheism but instead to suggest that in either case—either side of the argument—we are probably employing a red herring when we cite history that does little to help us uncover reality. Put another way, the claims of a given belief system, whether positive or negative, ultimately stand or fall on how accurately they represent truth within themselves. We can accept history as a form of evidence, but when we use that history as our sole basis for verification or falsification, I believe we run the risk of error, whether we say that (as in this thread) the world would be better off without religion (or is largely a matter of party loyalty as in Walker's argument) or that the slaughter under "atheistic Communism" demonstrates that atheism is the greater evil. Further, if we do use history as part of our guide, we should also seek to find instances that both affirm and refute a given faith system.

Now then, let's wade on in. Worth looking into from Walker's argument is this point:


As long as an atheist realizes that he/she is saying nothing about what actually does exist, his argument has merit. But I think it would also be naive to assume that when we assert what does not exist definitely (and are not merely agnostic on the matter), we have made an equally strong claim that (at least potentially) has as many repercussions as any positive claim, if not more. I would further posit that our atheism is not playing a "secondary role"—else we wouldn't be arguing it as we are—but rather a central one. But do you see the difference in my argumentation here? You may or may not agree with my point, but I am sticking to the actual belief-system of the atheist, not dragging in extraneous information as a diversionary tactic. Often outside information—such as how theists and atheists have traditionally behaved in history—can be used to argue a point and may very well count as a (weaker) form of evidence. However, this type of evidence should be used to support a proposition, not consist of the proposition in its entirety (unless of course we are simply making a historical observation and nothing more, something I do not detect in this argument). The reason I believe most people cite a claim like "history shows us we would be better off without theism" is because they already have concluded that theism is mistaken and making such a claim is likely to get their opponents squabbling over history, calling each other names, and making an awful scene, which never arrives at any substantial (and potentially refutable) information, such as "Theism is false, because...." You see, what people do in the name of a given system does not automatically tell us anything about that system, merely about what the people did. Further research into the system itself may reveal that the actions of the people was, in fact, in accordance with its commandments, but we will never know that until we go to the source—the system itself—and stop getting hung up on the actions of its followers. If we can demonstrate that the believers were acting in accord with their own professed system, we have a much stronger case to make than if we find out that they were being inconsistent with their system. If they are acting inconsistently with their system of belief, we can then denounce and deplore their actions, but we are still left with a system about which their actions has told us nothing except that they were being inconsistent with it.

Walker makes an interesting point when he says, "The theist will inevitably try to paint atheism as something more than it really is, and then try to refute their portrayal rather than atheism itself" (emphasis in original). This is precisely what we are doing when we point to history. We are not dealing with theism (or atheism) itself when we cite the monstrous atrocities of history, we are pointing to events. When we condemn these events, we are condemning events, but not automatically condemning a belief system. The only way we can be certain that we are condemning a belief system is by going to that belief system and finding out if the actions of its supposed followers are consistent with what it advocates. If we take historical events as our sole basis for condemning a belief system, we should beware less we be refuting our portrayal of a belief system when we have not taken the time to investigate its claims on their own merit. The fact that its followers did such things in its name (if, indeed, they truly did do such things in its name) might count as evidence that a given belief system is false (and not necessarily even then). But first we must ask, "Do the actions of these followers correspond to what that faith system posits?" Is the atheist remembering that he is saying nothing about what actually does exist? Is the theist, particularly the Christian, acting in accordance with the teachings of his faith?

Specifically with theism, I would submit to you that the reason so many people get up in arms about history is because they know that it isn't supposed to be that way based on the internal teachings of a given system of theism, which, in the West, is generally Christianity. They are disillusioned by the fact that theism (again, generally Christianity) is supposed to be positive, hopeful, and life-transforming and then, when they see hypocrisy, they are understandably disenchanted. But do you see the rub? Hypocrisy does not tell us that a given faith is false; it merely tells us that these persons are not acting in accordance with that faith (else they wouldn't be hypocrites, now would they?). So our real beef is with the hypocrites, not with the faith itself, even if we've never consciously considered this fact before. Or at least, that is all that our argument tells us; perhaps we also have a beef with the system itself, but if so, we should say so clearly and stop dragging out red herrings.

Should the atrocities of history have happened as they did? No, of course not. But what do they teach us about theism (or atheism)? Simply that theism (or atheism) might not be right. Apart from an investigation of how consistent its followers adhere to its claims, the only real way we can ever determine if theism (or atheism) is right or wrong is by determining if its internal teachings conform to the world as it really is and ought to be. If I say that I believe all apples are green and then paint a picture of a silver apple, it does not follow that apples are not then therefore green (and that this is so because they are obviously not silver) based on my actions to what I profess to believe. In other words, Eric says that all apples are green, but then paints a silver one. Because we know that there are no silver apples in nature, therefore Eric's hypocrisy clearly reveals that no apples are green. Now of course, someone is going to argue that there are at least two major flaws in my analogy, which I will readily grant: apples are things that can be empirically verified, the presence or absence of God cannot (see The Wind Bloweth Where it Listeth for more on the truth uncovering tool that is used for these types of claims); secondly, painting silver apples is far more benign than the wholesale slaughter of millions of people. But if you look at the actual structure of my argument from apples, you will see that this is precisely the type of reasoning people use when they dismiss the claims of theism (or atheism) wholesale: Eric says that all apples are green (Christianity is true), but then paints a silver one (the Crusades, for example). Because we know that there are no silver apples in nature (killing people is wrong), therefore Eric's hypocrisy clearly reveals that no apples are green (Christianity is not true).

A person may very well believe that atheism is false, wrong, immoral, deviant, or that dogma or doctrine is the great anathema that wreaks havoc on an otherwise beautiful thing or even that theism is plainly false. And, I suppose, if they say, "The world would be a better place without theism (or atheism) because of history" and that is all that they are saying and nothing more, then there is little more we can say to them. The problem is that most often, that is not all that people are saying when they make such claims; they are ultimately asserting a hidden premise that history proves that this way of conceiving the world is therefore also false. The fact that these points are then often used in a given argument to club others over the head clearly reveals this hidden premise, and when that happens, be wary: it may be that we are dismissing the greenness of apples because there are obviously no silver ones.

Now then, let's look at our dummy argument one more time. Let us say, to be totally fair and clear, that I profess that all apples are blue and then I paint a picture of a silver one. It you were to use the same reasoning as people often do with historical claims, you would say, "Eric's lack of consistency with his own profession clearly demonstrates that apples are not blue" with the implicit premise "because everyone knows that there are no silver apples." Now certainly it is true—at least the last time I checked—that there are no blue apples in nature. But I reject the claim of blue apples based on the fact I have never seen a blue apple, I have never heard anyone speak of a blue apple, I have never read of a blue apple: in all the thousands of things I have experienced in my lifetime, not once has there even been a hint of a blue apple in nature. But in that case, I am dismissing the first claim of Eric based on its own merits, not because of his hypocritical actions when he then paints one that is silver. Of course, this argument is silly anyway, because painting a picture that conflicts with a professed belief is not necessarily hypocritical: there could be thousands of reasons I would paint a silver apple while still strongly believing that all apples are blue. You are most welcome to pick apart my analogy in any way that you like, but when you do so, I would ask that you take to heart the real message I am trying to communicate in expressing it. What we're trying to do here is get at truth, not be overly critical of the instruments we have been reduced to employing.

So then, is theism false? Is atheism false? If enough Erics paint enough silver apples enough times, perhaps we should consider this as part of our evidence. But let us not make that the sole reason we dismiss the greenness (or blueness) of apples. As much as we are able, let us try to evaluate green apples and blue apples based on their own merits and not on what the Erics of the world do or do not happen to do at any given moment.

God bless,
Eric

Anger Management and the Koran

• Re(7): Religion or no Religion? - By Karen December 5, 2004 at 09:33:35 AM
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